Click here for the answer.

Update: Wow.  This brief post–really just a link to another blog–proved more controversial than I expected.  Matthew Yglesias accuses me of irresponsibly misleading America’s youth.  Scott Sumner responds to Yglesias, pointing out “if you are going to argue that people who make mistakes should be ostracized, it’s best not to make a serious mistake in your attack.” 

The issue is what to make of this table:

Click on graphic to enlarge.

Over at the Yglesias blog, a commentor named Peter Whiteford very usefully explains the table as follows:

I am the person who wrote the chapter in the OECD report that is the basis of these figures. It is part of a report on the distribution of income to households, so it doesn’t include taxes that are not directly paid by households, since these are not included in income surveys….[T]he table also calculates the distribution of taxes for the household as whole after adjusting for the number of people in the household, so it will differ from data calculated on income tax returns which are not adjusted for household size.

As others have pointed out this measure includes all direct taxes on individuals so it includes income taxes and employee social security contributions, but not employer payroll taxes. It also doesn’t include sales taxes, but these are much heavier in most other OECD countries, and not as progressive as direct taxes, so if you added indirect taxes in through some sort of modelling it is almost certain that the USA would still have the most progressive overall tax system.

However, as the OECD report points out, progressivity is not the same as redistribution. Progressivity measures how the distribution of the tax burden is shared, while redistribution measures how much the tax system reduces inequality. Redistribution is influenced both by the progressivity of taxes and the level of taxes collected.

In fact, the US system of direct taxes actually reduces inequality more than any other country as well. But overall, the USA reduces inequality a lot less than most other countries, because the other thing that you need to take into account is what taxes get spent on.

Now the US system of social security and cash benefits reduces inequality by less than any other OECD country except Korea. The US social security system is marginally less progressive then the OECD average, but the level of spending is very low – only Mexico and Korea spend less in the OECD.

So while the US tax system is progressive and reduces inequality, the US welfare state is much less effective at reducing inequality. And because the US has a very unequal distribution of income from capital and a much wider wage distribution than many other OECD countries, it ends up as a relatively unequal country after taxes and benefits.

If you look at Nordic countries, they all have much less progressive tax systems than the USA, but they collect a lot more in taxes (including in VAT). They then spend this much higher tax revenue on social security and services, and it is this side of the equation that is most important in reducing inequality.

So the implication is not that the USA either needs to increase or reduce the progressivity of the tax system. If you want to reduce inequality, you need to increase the level of taxes collected and spend it more effectively.

Raghu Rajan cites the work of Erik Hurst:

As my colleague Erik Hurst and his co-authors have shown, states that had the largest rise in construction as a share of GDP in 2000-2006 tended to have had the greatest contraction in that industry in 2006-2009. These states also tended to have the largest rise in unemployment rates between 2006 and 2009.

The unemployed comprise not only construction workers, but also ancillary workers, such as real-estate brokers and bankers, as well as all those who work on houses, such as plumbers and electricians. So, the job losses extend far beyond those in the construction industry.

It is hard to believe that any increase in aggregate demand will boost the housing market – which, remember, was buoyed by visions of steady price appreciation that few seem likely to hold today – sufficiently to re-employ all these workers. Hurst estimates that this “structural” unemployment may account for up to three percentage points of total unemployment. In other words, were it not for construction, the US unemployment rate would be 6.5% – a far healthier situation than today.

Update: Erik sends me the following email.

Greg,

I saw that you linked to Raghu’s writings which described some of my work in progress assessing labor market mismatch and its potential effects on current unemployment rates (joint with Kerwin Charles and Laura Pilossoph). There was, however, an error in Raghu’s assessment of our work. I am emailing Raghu as well. Raghu reported that we are finding that upwards of 3 percentage points of total U.S. unemployment can be explained by structural forces. That is not what we have found. Preliminary back of the envelop calculations suggest that upwards of 3 percentage points of the unemployment rate in high unemployment rate states like Nevada or Arizona may be due to structural forces – not 3 percentage points of total U.S. unemployment. The amount of total U.S. unemployment explained by structural forces will almost certainly be much less. For many states, back of the envelop calculations suggest that structural forces are much less important. I have not yet computed a back of the envelope calculation of the total unemployment rate that potentially can be explained by structural forces. While we are definitely finding results that structural forces are at play, we are not finding that 3 percentage points of the current total U.S. unemployment rate is due to structural forces. As the research evolves, however , our conclusions may change.

I want to stress that the work is still in its early stages. We are in the process of formalizing everything now. We are still a month or so away from having a preliminary version of the paper. I will keep you posted when we have something that we feel comfortable sharing for public consumption.

If you can post this message to your readers, it would be much appreciated. Based on your post, I have received lots of emails about our preliminary (and not yet ready for prime time) work. Hopefully, the correction will help to focus people’s queries and questions accordingly.

Erik

Mar 312010

Some pundits, reflecting on the looming U.S. budget deficits, claim that Americans are vastly undertaxed compared with other major nations.  I was wondering, to what extent is that true?

The most common metric for answering this question is taxes as a percentage of GDP.  However, high tax rates tend to depress GDP.  Looking at taxes as a percentage of GDP may mislead us into thinking we can increase tax revenue more than we actually can.  For some purposes, a better statistic may be taxes per person, which we can compute using this piece of advanced mathematics:

Taxes/GDP x GDP/Person = Taxes/Person

Here are the results for some of the largest developed nations:

France
.461 x 33,744 = 15,556

Germany
.406 x 34,219 = 13,893

UK
.390 x 35,165 = 13,714

US
.282 x 46,443 = 13,097

Canada
.334 x 38,290 = 12,789

Italy
.426 x 29,290 = 12,478

Spain
.373 x 29,527 = 11,014

Japan
.274 x 32,817 = 8,992

The bottom line: The United States is indeed a low-tax country as judged by taxes as a percentage of GDP, but as judged by taxes per person, the United States is in the middle of the pack.

Update: This post has been more controversial than I expected.  I am surprised because I did not say much here.  I merely presented an identity and some data, which illustrated international differences in a novel (and, I thought, interesting) way.  In any event, I thank Scott Sumner for coming to my defense.

Jan 312010

From Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff:

As government debt levels explode in the aftermath of the financial crisis, there is  growing uncertainty about how quickly to exit from today’s extraordinary fiscal stimulus. Our research on the long history of financial crises suggests that choices are not easy, no matter how much one wants to believe the present illusion of normalcy in markets. Unless this time is different – which so far has not been the case – yesterday’s financial crisis could easily morph into tomorrow’s government debt crisis.

In previous cycles, international banking crises have often led to a wave of sovereign defaults a few years later. The dynamic is hardly surprising, since public debt soars after a financial crisis, rising by an average of over 80 per cent within three years. Public debt burdens soar owing to bail-outs, fiscal stimulus and the collapse in tax revenues. Not every banking crisis ends in default, but whenever there is a huge international wave of crises as we have just seen, some governments choose this route.

We do not anticipate outright defaults in the largest crisis-hit countries, certainly nothing like the dramatic de facto defaults of the 1930s when the US and Britain abandoned the gold standard. Monetary institutions are more stable (assuming the US Congress leaves them that way). Fundamentally, the size of the shock is less. But debt burdens are racing to thresholds of (roughly) 90 per cent of gross domestic product and above. That level has historically been associated with notably lower growth.

While the exact mechanism is not certain, we presume that at some point, interest rate premia react to unchecked deficits, forcing governments to tighten fiscal policy. Higher taxes have an especially deleterious effect on growth. We suspect that growth also slows as governments turn to financial repression to place debts at sub-market interest rates.

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